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Introduction
IN 2005, PROFESSOR JOHN RUGGIE of the Harvard Kennedy
School, an eminent authority on corporate citizenship and responsi-
bility, received a United Nations (“U.N.”) mandate to propose mea-
sures aimed at strengthening the human rights performance of
transnational corporations.1 His task was a difficult one. Global gov-
ernance has historically been carried out through a Westphalian-type,
state-centered system;2 however, the rapid growth of transnational cor-
porations—largely spurred by globalization—has transformed the
traditional state-dominated social order. This transformation high-
lights the need for an international framework that would guide and
regulate the activities of transnational corporations.3
In the context of an emerging sentiment that human rights stan-
dards should be relevant among non-state actors,4 Ruggie embarked
* Associate, Goodwin Procter LLP; Boston University School of Law (J.D.);
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1. Molly Lanzarotta, John Ruggie on Business Practice and Human Rights, HARVARD KEN-
NEDY SCHOOL INSIGHT (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/publica-
tions/insight/markets/john-ruggie; Lene Wendland & John E. Grova, UN Human Rights
Council Endorses New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS OFF.
AT GENEVA (June 16, 2011), http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/%28http
NewsByYear_en%29/3D7F902244B36DCEC12578B10056A48F?OpenDocument.
2. John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM.
J. INT’L L. 819, 819 (2007).
3. Joel Slawotsky, Doing Business Around the World: Corporate Liability under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (2005).
4. Id.; Peter Muchlinski, International Business Regulation: An Ethical Discourse in the
Making?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND PUBLIC
SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS 81, 90 (Tom Campbell & Seumas Miller, eds., 2004).
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on a field research journey spanning several years which involved state
governments, corporations, business associations, investors and vari-
ous other stakeholders around the world.5 His efforts culminated in
the creation of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (“Guiding Principles”)—“a global standard for preventing and
addressing the risk of adverse human rights impacts linked to business
activity.”6 The Guiding Principles were released in early 20117 and in
an unprecedented move the U.N. Human Rights Council (“Council”)
formally endorsed them later that year.8 Even though Ruggie did not
have the power to create actual legal norms, the Council’s sanction
“establishe[d] the Guiding Principles as the authoritative global refer-
ence point for business and human rights,”9 and as a standardized yet
sufficiently flexible platform for action that could be implemented on
an international scale.10 Indeed, key businesses and organizations
have already incorporated the Guiding Principles into their work.11
Given that Ruggie’s framework may well serve as the basis for a
subsequent binding instrument or may itself influence the develop-
ment of customary international law,12 this article explores the ques-
tion of whether, as a policy matter, current American legislation—
particularly the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)—can be seen as an exam-
ple of an effective way that a state could implement the Guiding Prin-
ciples domestically. In doing so, the paper also examines the value of
the ATS as a means of achieving corporate social responsibility on the
global plane. Part I introduces the Guiding Principles, the “protect,
respect and remedy” framework that they are based on and the
problems that they seek to address. Part II expounds on the ATS and
the highly controversial issue of corporate liability under the statute
before conducting a critical analysis of relevant circuit-level jurispru-
dence and evaluating the extent to which such case law achieves the
5. Wendland & Grova, supra note 1.
6. Lanzarotta, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Wendland & Grova, supra note 1.
10. Michael Connor, Business and Human Rights: An Interview with John Ruggie, BUS.
ETHICS (Oct. 30, 2011), http://business-ethics.com/2011/10/30/8127-un-principles-on-
business-and-human-rights-interview-with-john-ruggie/.
11. Mark Taylor, Why States Were Right to Endorse Ruggie’s Guiding Principles, LAWS OF
RULE (June 30, 2011), http://www.lawsofrule.net/2011/06/30/ruggie-releases-guiding-
principles/.
12. John H. Knox, The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corpora-
tions, 20 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 1 (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/
insight110801.pdf.
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Guiding Principles’ main goals. The article concludes by highlighting
pertinent recent developments—specifically an impending Supreme
Court decision that may disallow corporate liability under the ATS.
I. The Guiding Principles and the “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework
A. The Rise of the Transnational Corporation
International law has traditionally been preoccupied with the
conduct of states, even though corporations—particularly in the last
few decades—have proven capable of interfering with the enjoyment
of human rights.13 Even though it is now well-established that individ-
uals have human rights under international law and duties under in-
ternational criminal law, this redefinition has impacted legal persons
such as corporations only tangentially: they possess certain rights
under international law, but generally cannot be held criminally
liable.14
This remedial gap in international law has become increasingly
controversial in the last two decades as transnational corporations
have become “‘the dominant form of organization responsible for the
international exchange of goods and services’ . . . and . . . [have]
found themselves in the startling position of outperforming the na-
tional economies of states . . . .”15 In light of the tremendous geopoliti-
cal clout that transnational corporations have accumulated, a parallel
sentiment has emerged that they should be held to a standard of ac-
countability similar to that owed by state actors.16 Admittedly, transna-
tional corporations have contributed to the productive and
technological upgrading of many host countries, particularly in the
developing world, by providing them with additional capital, know-
how and access to global markets.17 At the same time, however, they
have unsurprisingly tended to set up operation in states with business-
conducive climates, which typically presupposes low labor costs as well
13. Developments in the Law—Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human
Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2030 (2001) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
14. Id. The fact that corporate entities lack obligations under international criminal
law can be attributed to the fact different states treat the issue differently in their domestic
legal systems, with some states not recognizing corporate criminal liability. Id.
15. Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J.
(forthcoming Fall 2012) (citing Raymond Vernon, Transnational Corporations: Where are
They Coming From, Where are They Headed?, 1 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 7 (1992)).
16. See id.
17. Slawotsky, supra note 3, at 1066.
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as lax rules governing the protection of individuals and the environ-
ment.18 Combined with the ever-increasing exposure of corporate
governance problems worldwide, this tendency has caused much con-
cern about transnational corporations’ human rights violations in vul-
nerable regions.19
B. From Early Solutions to the Guiding Principles
The impact of corporate conduct on human rights first attracted
the attention of the U.N. in the late 1990s, triggering in 2003 the draft
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (“draft
Norms”).20 The draft Norms resembled a treaty and “sought to im-
pose on companies, directly under international law, the same range
of human rights duties” that are applicable to states.21 Once transmit-
ted to the now-defunct U.N. Commission on Human Rights (“Com-
mission”), however, the draft Norms proved to be highly polarizing.22
As they rested on the assumption that international law is directly appli-
cable to corporations, giving rise to a host of duties—a claim that has
otherwise been overwhelmingly rejected by scholars and commenta-
tors alike23—they faced tremendous opposition from the business
community and were rejected by the Commission in 2004.24
Albeit ultimately unsuccessful, the draft Norms received the sup-
port of numerous human rights groups and clearly demonstrated that
the question of transnational corporate accountability was, more than
ever, at the forefront of the global agenda.25 Thus, in 2005, the Com-
18. Marion Weschka, Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises: How Can Multina-
tional Enterprises be Held Responsible for Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad?, 66 ZAO¨RV
625, 626 (2006).
19. Slawotsky, supra note 3, at 1068.
20. John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM.
J. INT’L L. 819, 820 (2007).
21. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Final
Report]. They envisioned that corporate compliance with such duties would be monitored
by national and international agencies, and that the victims would be provided with effec-
tive remedies. Ruggie, supra note 2, at 820.
22. Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human
Rights Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 47
(2008).
23. John H. Knox, The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations, 3 (Aug.
16, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author and SSRN), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916664.
24. Duruigbo, supra note 22, at 242 & n.142.
25. Ruggie, supra note 2, at 821.
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mission requested the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to appoint
a special representative, whose mandate would be to “identify and
clarify international standards and policies in relation to business and
human rights . . . and submit views and recommendations for consid-
eration by the Commission.”26 The challenge for Ruggie, Annan’s ap-
pointee, was to work in the shadow of the draft Norms, which is why,
at the very outset of his mandate, he distanced himself from the idea
that human rights law can impose direct obligations on transnational
corporations.27 He instead took the position that—except for geno-
cide, torture, slavery or other particularly heinous human rights viola-
tions that amount to international crimes28—non-state actors such as
corporations do not have a per se duty to observe human rights.29 As a
result, Ruggie’s approach did not directly invoke but instead drew on
human rights law in advocating for heightened standards for corpo-
rate behavior.30
By conceiving a framework that synchronizes existing state and
business practices, and that is largely consistent with the law as it is as
opposed to advancing “exaggerated legal claims”31 like the draft
Norms, Ruggie ensured the practical enforceability and significance
of his work. In June 2011, Ruggie’s pragmatism culminated in the
Council’s formal endorsement of the Guiding Principles.32 Even
though the Guiding Principles are not legally binding, the Council’s
sanction establishes them as a global standard and an “authoritative
focal point for both states and businesses.”33 Furthermore, they have
already been espoused and employed by state governments, compa-
nies, civil society, workers’ organizations, human rights institutions,
and investors.34 They are thus expected to play an increasingly impor-
tant role in the future, forming part of customary international law or
even influencing the passage of a legally binding instrument.35
26. Id.
27. Knox, supra note 23, at 11.
28. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) [here-
inafter Interim Report].
29. Connor, supra note 10.
30. Knox, supra note 23, at 15–16.
31. Interim Report, supra note 28, ¶ 59; Lanzarotta, supra note 1.
32. Id.; see also Knox, supra note 23, at 15.
33. Lanzarotta, supra note 1.
34. Final Report, supra note 21, ¶ 7.
35. See Knox, supra note 12.
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C. The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework
The Guiding Principles’ framework consists of three pillars—
“protect, respect and remedy”—that form an interrelated system of
preventative and remedial measures.36 The “protect” pillar postulates
that, under the existing international human rights regime, states
have a fundamental duty to protect against human rights abuses com-
mitted by state agents and third parties, including businesses.37 Under
the “respect” pillar, business enterprises ought to exhibit corporate
responsibility, meaning that they “should avoid infringing on the
human rights of others and should address adverse human rights im-
pacts with which they are involved.”38 The corporate responsibility to
respect human rights contemplates actions above and beyond compli-
ance with applicable laws.39 Indeed, it presupposes the performance
of what Ruggie describes as “human rights due diligence”—a process
that includes “assessing actual and potential human rights impacts,
integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and
communicating how impacts are addressed.”40 Finally, the “remedy”
pillar emphasizes the need for greater access by victims to effective
remedies; these include state-administered judicial, administrative,
legislative or other remedies, as well as company-administered, non-
judicial grievance mechanisms that may address issues early on before
they escalate into lawsuits.41
II. Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute consists of a single sentence: “The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”42 Specifically, it allows aliens to bring claims in
federal courts for gross human rights violations committed in the U.S.
or abroad.43 The U.S. is the only country to permit such suits, in
which the defendants are often not American, are being sued for
“conduct that occurred wholly outside of the U.S., . . . impacted for-
eign citizens alone, and . . . had no effect whatsoever within the
36. Final Report, supra note 21, ¶ 6.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Connor, supra note 10.
40. Final Report, supra note 21, ¶ 17.
41. Id. ¶¶ 25, 29.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
43. See id.
Summer 2012] THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 95
U.S.”44 Some recent circuit-court decisions have interpreted the ATS
to apply not just to state actors, but to corporations as well—both
American and foreign.45 By enabling federal courts to establish juris-
diction over business entities, the ATS seems to function in the spirit
of the Guiding Principles, which seek to promote corporate responsi-
bility. As a result, the ATS—as a policy matter—could be seen as an
example of an effective way that a nation-state could implement the
Guiding Principles’ “protect, respect and remedy” framework. Part II
introduces the issue of corporate liability under the ATS generally,
analyzes some circuit-level jurisprudence on the issue of whether
TNCs could be held liable under the ATS, and concludes by evaluat-
ing the extent to which such case law achieves the framework’s three
goals.
A. Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute
While the ATS has been on the books since 1789, for years it re-
mained an enigma. For example, there is no record of legislative de-
bate on its purpose and “consensus of what Congress intended has
proven elusive.”46 Indeed, it had essentially fallen into desuetude until
1980, when, in Filartiga v. Pen˜a-Irala,47 the Second Circuit found a
Paraguayan citizen liable for tortious acts committed in Paraguay, but
emphasized that the statute only applies to state actors or, as was the
case there, private individuals acting under the color of official au-
thority.48 In its 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,49 the Supreme
Court held that it is international as opposed to domestic law that
informs what constitutes a violation of “the law of the nations” under
the ATS.50 The Court nonetheless left open the question of which
body of law is applicable to ascertaining the categories of potential
perpetrators that can be held liable for such violations.51 Depending
44. Jack Auspitz, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Business Lawyer, NAT’L SECURITY
L. 2 (Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.net/National%20Security
%20Law.Auspitz.Alien%20Tort%20Statute%20Litigation%20(2008).pdf.
45. See discussion infra Part II.B.
46. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004).
47. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. Id. at 878–84. The case was brought by a Paraguayan couple, the Filartigas, whose
seventeen-year old son was kidnapped, tortured and murdered by Pen˜a-Irala, a state offi-
cial, allegedly motivated by Mr. Filartiga’s political activities. Id. at 878.
49. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
50. Id. at 728, 732–33 & n.21.
51. Id. at 732 n.20 (“A related question is whether international law extends the scope
of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is
a private actor such as a corporation or an individual.”).
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on whether they choose to prioritize international or domestic law in
the context of perpetrator identity, the federal appellate courts that
have considered the issue have reached varying results; the over-
whelming majority, however, concluded that corporations, similar to
states, could be held liable under the ATS.52 Only one circuit court
has held otherwise.53
B. Circuit Split on the Issue of Corporate Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute
1. Second Circuit: No Access to Effective Remedy
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company54 came before the Second
Circuit in 2010 and involved residents of the Ogoni region in Nige-
ria.55 The plaintiffs argued that the defendant oil company—Royal
Dutch Shell, incorporated in the Netherlands and the United King-
dom, respectively—aided and abetted the Nigerian government in the
commission of human rights violations against them since 1958.56
They specifically alleged that, at the insistence and financial induce-
ment of the company, the government suppressed local environmen-
tal protests, raped and killed residents of the region, and frequently
destroyed their property.57 The Second Circuit acknowledged that,
from the perspective of a legal culture that is well accustomed to the
concept of corporate liability, it may seem tempting to conclude that
corporations should be subject to liability under the ATS.58 However,
the court reasoned that the statute requires courts to look to interna-
tional law instead: “the fact that corporations are liable as juridical
persons under domestic law does not mean that they are liable under
international law (and, therefore, under the ATS).”59 The Second Cir-
cuit thus held that the oil company is not subject to ATS liability since
customary international law does not recognize the notion of corpo-
rate liability for international crimes.60
Kiobel provides a strong—if not blatant—example of a scenario in
which all three pillars of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework
were violated. Royal Dutch Shell did not abide by their corporate re-
52. See discussion infra Part II.B.
53. Id.
54. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
55. Id. at 123.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 117.
59. 621 F.3d at 118.
60. Id. at 120.
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sponsibility to respect human rights, hardly employed due diligence
to avoid infringing on the rights of others and failed to address the
adverse impacts associated with their operations. The Nigerian gov-
ernment also neglected to discharge its duty to protect against human
rights abuses involving business enterprises. The “remedy” pillar—
which emphasizes redress, “both for its significance to victims as well
as the crucial preventative role effective and dissuasive remediation
processes can have”61—was violated as well. Company-administered,
non-judicial grievance mechanisms were likely unavailable, or at the
very least were ineffective. Given that the plaintiffs brought their
claims in the United States, judicial remedies under Nigerian law were
also presumably either lacking or unsuccessfully exhausted. In deny-
ing ATS jurisdiction over Royal Dutch Shell, the Second Circuit de-
nied the plaintiffs access to a judicial remedy in federal court.
Unfortunately, the court’s decision in Kiobel reflects a view on corpo-
rate accountability that is dramatically out of tune with the Guiding
Principles and their emphasis on preventative and remedial measures.
2. Eleventh Circuit: Pleading Obstacles
Two years before the Second Circuit decided Kiobel, the Eleventh
Circuit became the first federal appellate court to address the issue of
corporate liability under the ATS. In its 2008 decision in Romero v.
Drummond Company, Inc.,62 the court held that the ATS “grants juris-
diction from complaints against corporate defendants[,]” simply stat-
ing that it was bound by its own precedent—namely, a 2005 case that
found state action, but did not in fact directly address the question of
whether corporations could be sued as private actors.63 Even though it
provided no glimpses of its reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit most re-
cently affirmed this ruling in Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Company.64 That
case—originally filed in the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida—involved a Colombian workers’ union which alleged in four
separate claims that Coca-Cola and its bottling subsidiary collaborated
with local paramilitary and police to intimidate, kidnap and torture
several bottling facility union leaders and murdered another.65 The
61. Haley St. Dennis, Kiobel Case Reminder of Remedy Gaps Still to be Bridged, INST. FOR
HUMAN RTS. & BUS. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/staff/kiobel-case-
reminder-of-remedy-gaps-still-to-be-bridged.html.
62. 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
63. Id. at 1315; see also Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1242
(11th Cir. 2005).
64. 578 F.3d 1252, 1258–60 (11th Cir. 2009).
65. Id.
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Southern District of Florida dismissed all claims pointing out the bot-
tler’s agreements did not give Coca-Cola any meaningful control over
the facility’s operations and labor policies as the plaintiffs had al-
leged.66 In the absence of such control, the court could not find con-
certed action between Coca-Cola and the paramilitaries.67 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the suits against the
company.68
This negative outcome hardly signaled the Eleventh Circuit’s
changing attitude toward the issue of corporate liability under the
ATS. Instead, the court reiterated that “corporate defendants are sub-
ject to liability under the ATS[,]”69 and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims
on a technicality—a failure to sufficiently plead factual allegations
under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.70 With its 2007
decision in Twombly, the Supreme Court established a heightened
pleading standard for federal civil lawsuits, requiring plaintiffs to
“plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face”—not merely conceivable.71 With Iqbal, decided two years later,
the Court clarified Twombly, stating that “the tenet that a court must
accept a complaint’s allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare
recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory
statements.”72 In Sinaltrainal, the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly
state whether ATS claims were subject to such a heightened pleading
standard,73 but affirmed much of the district court’s reasoning, thus
adopting Twombly and Iqbal’s “facial plausibility” test.74 Pursuant to
this test, the court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations were too vague
and their deductions too unwarranted, and that such an “attenuated
chain of conspiracy” failed to “nudge their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.”75
66. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354–55 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
67. Id. at 1355.
68. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1252.
69. Id. at 1263.
70. Id. at 1263–70. With Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a height-
ened pleading standard. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
71. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
72. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy further noted that
“determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the
reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 663–64.
73. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1265 n.14 (“We need not, and specifically do not, decide
whether a heightened pleading standard may be used in evaluating the elements of an
ATS . . . claim.”).
74. Id. at 1260.
75. Id. at 1268.
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By not officially exonerating Coca-Cola for the events that had
transpired in Colombia and by giving the workers’ union an opportu-
nity to seek redress, Sinaltrainal is much more in line with the Guiding
Principles than Kiobel. Indeed, while the plaintiffs may have lost, it has
been cogently argued that, in the modern day and age, ATS litigation
is hardly limited to the four corners of the courtroom or to traditional
motion practice:
Old-fashioned motions and pleadings are now accompanied by
public-relations campaigns complete with documentaries, commu-
nity organizing, political lobbying and efforts to drive down stock
prices of companies and multinationals with a U.S. presence. [It is]
all part of an effort to inflict maximum punishment on companies
that choose to fight, trying to force them into lucrative settlements
for alleged conduct overseas, and to pressure foreign courts in
cases filed abroad.76
Thus, even if the success of an ATS claim seems unlikely, media cover-
age, political campaigns and boycotts can cause reputational harm
and financial detriment to the defendant company that can be valua-
ble in instilling corporate responsibility to respect human rights.77 In
light of this, the mere act of giving victims of human rights violations
an opportunity to sue could, to some extent at least, fulfill the Guid-
ing Principles’ “respect” pillar, which imposes on business enterprises
the responsibility of acting with due diligence to avoid infringing
upon the rights of others. Despite the dismissal in Sinaltrainal, for in-
stance, “Coca-Cola was not left unscathed, suffering damage to its im-
age and lost contracts.”78 Furthermore, public pressure against
corporate defendants could force them into sizeable settlements for
76. Jonathan Drimmer, Think Globally, Sue Locally, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2010, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704002104575291101685354766.
html.
77. See id.; Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multifaceted Tool to
Avoid Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While Simultaneously Building Better Business Reputation,
40 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 55, 58 (2009) (“[I]f publicly-traded multinational corporations wish
to maintain high profit margins and continue to reap the benefits of globalization, they
must implement sound Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) measures related to human
rights . . . thereby . . . enabling corporations to avoid the costs of both ATS litigation and
reputational harm.”); Sarah A. Altschuller et al., United States of America: Local Human Rights
Environment, EUR. LAW. (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.europeanlawyer.co.uk/reference
books_26_508.html.
78. Theresa Adamski, The Alien Tort Claims Act and Corporate Liability: A Threat to the
United States’ International Relations, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1502, 1536 (2011); see also Drim-
mer, supra note 76 (“It was no coincidence that a lawsuit filed against Coca Cola . . . [in]
February [2010] in New York City’s federal court coincided with a release of a documen-
tary called ‘The Coca Cola Case.’ The documentary featured the [plaintiffs’] lawyers in the
case—concerning allegations of violence against workers at a Guatemala bottling facility—
and five others like it in Turkey and Colombia.”).
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alleged misconduct overseas,79 thereby giving meaning to the Guiding
Principles’ “remedy” pillar as well.
Nevertheless, the Sinaltrainal court’s demand for high pleading
specificity may create significant obstacles for human rights plaintiffs
in the Eleventh Circuit.80 Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, notice pleading
provided plaintiffs with greater access to courts and thereby provided
meaningful access to essential discovery mechanisms. The current
Iqbal/Twombly regime precludes many plaintiffs’ access to the courts by
forcing them to “arrive in federal courts already armed with enough
information to convince judges that their allegations are plausible”81
without the benefit of discovery. Such a heightened pleading require-
ment and investigatory burden may well prevent meritorious claims
from being filed altogether, particularly in light of the fact that the
average ATS defendant—a large, wealthy and powerful transnational
corporation—is significantly better positioned than the average ATS
plaintiff—be it a Colombian union or a group of long-suffering Ogoni
residents—to ferret out the information that is necessary to resolve a
suit on the merits.82 The Eleventh Circuit may consequently fall short
of providing the effective remedies that are so integral to the Guiding
Principles’ framework.
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that the Guiding Principles
speak to a state’s duty to provide such remedies domestically.83 ATS liti-
gation, however, often revolves around events that took place in an
overseas jurisdiction, and around parties that are all foreign—mean-
ing that some cases that are brought in federal court do not have a
nexus to the United States.84 Indeed, the ATS is a unique statute,
which allows parties to bring lawsuits that they may not be able to
bring elsewhere, and turns the federal courts into a highly attractive
venue for human rights plaintiffs.85
79. Drimmer, supra note 76.
80. Civil Procedure—Pleading Requirements—Eleventh Circuit Dismisses Alien Tort Statute
Claims Against Coca-Cola Under Iqbal’s Plausibility Pleading Standard, 123 HARV. L. REV. 580,
584 (2009) [hereinafter Pleading Requirements].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Final Report, supra note 21, ¶ 25 (“As part of their duty to protect against business-
related human rights abuse, States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through politi-
cal, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur
within their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy.” (em-
phasis added)).
84. Pleading Requirements, supra note 80, at 584.
85. See Sarah A. Altschuller, U.S. Supreme Court Review of Corporate Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute—an Overview of the Oral Arguments in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,
CORP. SOC. RESP. & L. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2012/02/articles/
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Curbing lax pleading may thus serve the important purpose of
preventing ATS litigation from infringing on sovereign states’ inter-
ests to adjudicate disputes arising within their borders and U.S. for-
eign policy, or from exerting considerable settlement pressures on
corporate defendants whose reputations are on the line, regardless of
how plausible the allegations are.86 Given the fundamental unique-
ness of the ATS, the very fact that foreign human rights plaintiffs are
allowed to have their day in federal court—even if they are burdened
with procedural obstacles—may be enough to meet the Guiding Prin-
ciples’ expectations. On the other hand, one might argue that reme-
dies should be more available not because the Guiding Principles are
binding or because the U.S. has a connection to the case, but simply
because this would better reflect the spirit of the “protect, respect and
remedy” framework—a framework that has already achieved the status
of a global standard.87
3. The Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits: Further Procedural
Obstacles
Whereas the Eleventh Circuit found it sufficient to merely state
that business entities can be held liable under the ATS, other federal
appellate courts—specifically the Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits—
have made more meaningful attempts to explain their finding of ATS
jurisdiction over corporate defendants.88 At the same time, however,
these courts “have begun to constrain the ability of plaintiffs to file
such cases . . . by employing domestic procedural devices that limit the
application of international law in domestic courts.”89
The plaintiffs in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC90 were residents of Bou-
gainville, Papua New Guinea,91 where the defendant company Rio
litigation/alien-tort-statute/us-supreme-court-review-of-corporate-liability-under-the-alien-
tort-statute-an-overview-of-the-oral-arguments-in-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/.
86. Pleading Requirements, supra note 80, at 584.
87. See Taylor, supra note 11.
88. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011);
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d
736 (9th Cir. 2011). The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have yet to
address the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. Sarah A. Altschuller, The Federal
Courts and Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute, CORP. SOC. RESP. & L. (Sept. 27,
2010), http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2010/09/articles/litigation/alien-tort-statute/the-
federal-courts-and-corporate-liability-under-the-alien-tort-statute/.
89. Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 728 (2012).
90. 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
91. Id. at 742.
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Tinto—a British-Australian mining group headquartered in
London—began constructing a mine in the 1960s.92 The plaintiffs al-
leged that, as a result of the mine’s construction and operation, Rio
Tinto displaced villages, destroyed the rainforest, polluted the envi-
ronment, systematically discriminated against its local workers by es-
tablishing a differential wage system and forcing them to live in slave-
like conditions, and ultimately “ ‘ripped apart’ the culture, economy,
and life of Bougainville.”93 In the late 1980s, the local residents started
an uprising, which quickly descended into civil war.94 The plaintiffs
further alleged that during the war, the government—pressured by
Rio Tinto—“encouraged and supported [a] food and medical block-
ade that resulted in the deaths of thousands of people . . . .”95
Unlike the Kiobel court, the Ninth Circuit thought it more appro-
priate to focus not on whether a particular international institution
has been held criminally liable, but on whether international law ex-
tends its prohibitions to the perpetrators in question.96 In that regard,
the court pointed to a decision by the International Court of Justice,
which had held that genocide—whether committed by an individual,
a state or an amorphous, loosely-affiliated group—is always a violation
of international law.97 Since all these types of actors can commit geno-
cide and since the prohibition on doing so is a universal jus cogens
norm, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it is only reasonable to as-
sume that corporations can commit genocide under international law
as well.98
Even though it permitted corporate liability under the ATS, the
Ninth Circuit very clearly indicated its willingness to impose strict ex-
haustion-of-remedies requirements in cases against corporations.99
Specifically, it noted that “ ‘[t]he defendant bears the burden to plead
and justify an exhaustion requirement, including the availability of lo-
cal remedies.’”100 Moreover, simply initiating a lawsuit in a foreign
state would be insufficient. Instead, the plaintiffs must “obtain a final
92. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
93. Id. at 1121–24.
94. Id. at 1124–26.
95. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 779. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the government
“bombed civilian targets, engaged in wanton killing and acts of cruelty, burned houses and
villages, raped women, and pillaged.” Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
96. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 743–44.
97. Id. at 759–60 (quoting Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia, 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 167
(Feb. 26)).
98. Id.
99. Childress, supra note 89, at 728.
100. Id. (citing Sarei, 550 F.3d at 831–32).
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decision of the highest court in the hierarchy of courts in the legal
system at issue, or show that the state of the law or availability of reme-
dies would make further appeal futile.”101 In practice, such require-
ments function very similarly to the pleading standard employed by
the Eleventh Circuit in Sinaltrainal because requiring human rights
plaintiffs to go through the entire judicial system in their respective
foreign jurisdictions would make it substantially more difficult for
them to bring their claims in federal courts. This may consequently
create redress gaps that are inconsistent with the Guiding Principles’
“remedy” pillar.
Decided only a month before Sarei, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corpora-
tion102 was filed by residents of the Aceh province in Indonesia.103
Plaintiffs alleged that Exxon Mobil—which operated a natural gas fa-
cility in Aceh and employed members of the Indonesian military as
security—aided and abetted these military members in committing
atrocities against the plaintiffs including “genocide, extrajudicial kill-
ing, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual violence, and kidnap-
ping . . . as part of a systematic campaign of extermination of the
people of Aceh . . . .”104 The District Court for the District of Colum-
bia dismissed the case on three bases: that aiding and abetting was not
actionable under the ATS, that such an inquiry would amount to an
impermissible interference with Indonesia’s sovereignty, and that sex-
ual violence was not a violation of the law of nations.105 In reversing
the district court, the D.C. Circuit distinguished between substance
and procedure. Specifically, the court found that—whereas it is sub-
stantive international customary law that determines what types of tor-
tious conduct are actionable under the ATS—whether or not
corporations can be held liable is not part of that substantive in-
quiry.106 The court then examined the ATS in a historical context and
determined that its purpose—to avoid foreign entanglement—does
not make it reasonable to legislate only against individuals when cor-
101. Sarei, 550 F.3d at 732; Childress, supra note 89, at 728–29.
102. 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
103. Id. at 15.
104. Id. (internal citations omitted).
105. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005).
106. Exxon, 654 F.3d at 42 (“[T]he fact that the law of nations provides no private right
of action to sue corporations addresses the wrong question and does not demonstrate that
corporations are immune from liability under the ATS. There is no right to sue under the
law of nations; no right to sue natural persons, juridical entities, or states.”).
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porations are capable of performing acts that can incite conflict as
well.107
The plaintiffs in Exxon—similar to the plaintiffs in other recent
ATS cases—did not plead only ATS claims, but also “claims in diversity
or supplemental claims, alleging the same facts as a violation of state
or foreign law.”108 While a perfectly reasonable guess might be that
such claims would fare poorly in federal court, the choice-of-law analy-
sis employed by different courts has been inconsistent.109 In Exxon, for
example, the district court applied Delaware and District of Columbia
law to events that had occurred in Indonesia—specifically to the ques-
tion of whether it can award punitive damages even though Indone-
sian law does not authorize them—because of the strong interest that
the U.S. had in applying domestic law to its corporations.110 Whereas
applying U.S. damages law meant that the plaintiffs could obtain sub-
stantial awards, it also meant that their state-law claims would be dis-
missed on the basis of American prudential-standing doctrines.111
This rationale—although currently limited to the D.C. Circuit—
“could serve to end nearly all human-rights litigation filed by aliens in
the United States courts.”112
Finally, the plaintiffs in Flomo v. Firestone National Rubber Com-
pany113—Liberian nationals—filed a claim against the American com-
pany Firestone, which operated a large rubber plantation in Liberia
through a subsidiary and employed thousands of people who lived on
the plantation with their families.114 The plaintiffs alleged that Fire-
stone indirectly used “hazardous child labor on the plantation in viola-
tion of customary international law” by setting daily quotas that were
so difficult to meet that the employees would often “dragoon their
wives or children into helping them . . . .”115 The Seventh Circuit held
that business entities can be liable under the ATS and observed that
107. Id. at 46–47 (“[T]he Founders and the First Congress recognized that the inability
to respond to such violations could lead to the United States’ entanglement in foreign
conflicts when a single citizen abroad offended a foreign power by violating the law of
nations. . . . The historical context, in clarifying the text and purpose of the ATS, suggests
no reason to conclude that the First Congress was supremely concerned with the risk that
natural persons would cause the United States to be drawn into foreign entanglements, but
was content to allow formal legal associations of individuals, i.e., corporations, to do so.”).
108. Childress, supra note 89, at 744.
109. Id. at 744–45.
110. Id. at 745.
111. Id. at 746.
112. Id.
113. 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
114. Id. at 1015, 1023.
115. Id.
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the Kiobel majority was simply wrong in stating that customary interna-
tional law does not recognize corporate liability reasoning that at the
end of the Second World War the allied powers relied on customary
international law to dissolve certain German corporations that had as-
sisted the Nazi effort.116 The court further noted that, even if there is
no such precedent, “[t]here is always a first time for litigation to en-
force a norm there has to be.”117
More fundamentally, however, in rejecting Kiobel’s rationale, the
Seventh Circuit argued that there are no compelling reasons as to why
corporations have rarely been held civilly liable for violations of cus-
tomary international law, except perhaps for a desire to limit liability
to “abhorrent conduct—the kind of conduct that invites criminal
sanctions.”118 In finding that corporate liability is actionable under
the ATS, the court emphasized that international law only imposes
substantive obligations leaving it up to the states to enforce them as
they see fit either through criminal or civil liability.119 The Flomo court
therefore attached little significance to the historical difference be-
tween civil and criminal actions against business entities, observing
that corporate criminal liability is a rarely-used method of social con-
trol only because of the wide availability of corporate tort remedies
throughout the world.120
Despite this cogent analysis that is ostensibly favorable to human-
rights plaintiffs, Flomo set a particularly high mens rea standard for ATS
liability, thereby still constraining the ability of plaintiffs to file such
cases.121 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit provided that “corporate lia-
bility for . . . violations [of customary international law] is limited to
cases in which the violations are directed, encouraged, or condoned
at the corporate defendant’s decisionmaking level.”122 Stated differ-
ently, the Seventh Circuit allows corporate liability only in instances
when the defendant company’s management was an active participant
in the tortious decision-making process.123
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit in Exxon held that mere knowledge
would be sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement for aiding and
116. Id. at 1017.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1018.
119. Flomo, 643 F.3d. at 1020.
120. Id. at 1019.
121. Id. at 1020–21 (expressing objection “not to corporate liability for violations of
customary international law but to the scope of such liability”).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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abetting liability under the ATS.124 To arrive at this holding, the Exxon
court examined precedent from the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as from the Nurem-
berg tribunals, demonstrating that they used a “knowledge” stan-
dard.125 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit’s “purposeful intent”
standard—which, as some scholars would agree, does indeed misinter-
pret customary international law126—will make it more difficult for
human rights plaintiffs to prove mens rea and will limit their access to
effective remedy.
In sum, the Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have all
allowed corporate liability under the ATS but have nonetheless insti-
tuted various procedural limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to sue
in federal court for business entity-inflicted trans-national harms.
Thus, even though these courts have interpreted the ATS and interna-
tional law broadly so as to benefit human rights plaintiffs, they have
also indicated a propensity to restrict either the application of interna-
tional law in—or the access of foreign plaintiffs to—federal courts. As
they make it more difficult for alleged victims to obtain redress, such
procedural barriers are at odds with the Guiding Principles’ three-pil-
lar framework, which has already achieved the status of a global stan-
dard for prevention and remediation in the context of human rights
abuses linked to business activity.127
Conclusion
In October 2011, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in Kiobel to determine whether corpora-
tions can be held liable under the ATS.128 At oral argument, which
took place in February 2012, the Justices seemed split on the funda-
mental question that was at issue: whether international law must ex-
pressly provide for corporate liability in order for business entities to
be proper defendants under the ATS, or whether corporate liability is
instead a procedural question that can be decided by domestic
124. Exxon, 654 F.3d at 39.
125. Id.
126. See Angela Walker, Comment, The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort Statute
the Mens Rea Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting is Knowledge, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 119, 120–21 (2011).
127. See Knox, supra note 12.
128. Mike Sachs, Supreme Court to Rule on Corporate Personhood for Crimes Against Human-
ity, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/su-
preme-court_n_1015953.html.
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courts.129 Furthermore, even though the issue was not directly before
the Court, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito
each questioned whether ATS cases could be brought in U.S. courts to
begin with, considering that they concern abuses committed
abroad.130 In an unusual move, in March 2012, the Court requested
additional briefing on this very question and will re-hear the case dur-
ing its 2012–2013 term.131 “The Court’s request for supplemental
briefing highlights the general importance to the Court of avoiding
the international friction that would inevitably result were the United
States to decide cases arising from actions conducted entirely
abroad.”132 As extraterritoriality is now part of the inquiry, Kiobel
could have far broader implications than was originally anticipated.133
In particular, the Court could avoid the corporate liability question
altogether by simply finding that the ATS does not apply
extraterritorially.134
The ATS is only one example of the Court’s “hardline” approach
to the extraterritorial application of American statutes, which is mostly
due to the fact that “so many statutes fail to provide sufficient histori-
cal evidence of contrary congressional intent to support a successful
rebuttal.”135 This, however, is hardly the case with the ATS. The very
text of the statute—as well as “the noticeable absence of a discussion
on the presumption against extraterritoriality in Sosa”—strongly sug-
gests that federal courts have ATS jurisdiction over conduct that takes
place overseas.136 There are therefore several reasons why it behooves
the Supreme Court to rule not only that the ATS applies extraterritori-
ally, but also that it can be used to hold business entities liable.
First, in the landmark Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion,137 the Supreme Court recognized corporations as “persons” in
129. Altschuller, supra note 85.
130. Id.
131. Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Kiobel Update: Supreme Court Orders Re-argument
and Supplemental Briefing on Extraterritoriality, HARV. INT’L HUMAN RTS. CLINIC (Mar. 6,
2012), http://harvardhumanrights.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/kiobel-update-supreme-
court-orders-re-argument-and-supplemental-briefing-on-extraterritoriality/.
132. Lisa Sokolowski, U.S. Supreme Court Orders Reargument in Kiobel, PRODUCT LIABILITY




135. Michelle K. Fiechter, Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute: The
Effect of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. on Future Litigation, 97 IOWA L. REV. 959,
978–79 (2012).
136. Id. at 979.
137. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
108 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
the context of free speech and held that they can engage in un-
restricted independent spending for political purposes138. If society is
to grant companies such unique powers and privileges, it is only rea-
sonable for the Court to strengthen corporate accountability in order
to balance out the expansion of corporate rights.139
Second, allowing business entities to be sued for human rights
violations under the ATS would readily comport with the Guiding
Principles and the “protect, respect and remedy” framework that they
espouse. As Ruggie’s work is likely to become even more influential in
the future and may even inspire a legally binding instrument, the U.S.
may wish to remain at the forefront of human rights protection by
providing the rest of the world with an example of an effective way
that a state can implement the Guiding Principles domestically.
Finally, and in a similar vein, it has been argued over and over
again that “corporations retain a significant potential for positively
shaping the world we live in . . . .”140 The Guiding Principles unam-
biguously demonstrate the international community’s commitment to
harnessing this potential and minimizing the adverse impact of corpo-
rate action on the enjoyment of human rights.141 By allowing corpo-
rate liability under the ATS, the Supreme Court would ensure that
individuals like the child laborers in Liberia or the residents of Bou-
gainville, Papua New Guinea can seek a remedy for the abuses they
endured regardless of where they took place.142 Indeed, the ATS is at
present one of the very few legal mechanisms available to human
rights plaintiffs who want to bring claims against business entities.143
To fulfill the Guiding Principles’ basic premise stressing effective pre-
vention and remediation, however, federal courts need to reconsider
the hefty procedural requirements that they have imposed on such
plaintiffs because they have the unfortunate potential to deter highly
urgent and legitimate claims.
138. Id. at 913.
139. Walker, supra note 126, at 145; see also Citizens United v. FCC, 130 S.Ct. 876
(2010).
140. Blitt, supra note 15.
141. Id.
142. Fiechter, supra note 135, at 979. Such a holding would not simply be consistent
with the Guiding Principles; rather, it would inure to the benefit of transnational corpora-
tions themselves, as they have a stake in enduring profitability. See Blitt, supra note 15. In
that regard, a strong argument can be made that, in the long run, corporations are going
to thrive better if they heed to the basic rights of the people in whose communities they
operate. If the social ills in those communities are appropriately addressed, transnational
corporations might be in a stronger position to extract long-term, sustainable profits. See id.
143. Dennis, supra note 61.
